Masking Genesys Cloud Web Messaging Guest PII Fields with Go

StarAdmin · January 16, 2026, 9:28am

Masking Genesys Cloud Web Messaging Guest PII Fields with Go

What You Will Build

A Go middleware service that intercepts web messaging payloads, constructs PII masking directives, validates against messaging constraints, sanitizes guest data using atomic WebSocket operations, and forwards compliant messages to Genesys Cloud. The service uses the Genesys Cloud Messaging API, Webhook API, and OAuth2 client credentials flow. The implementation is written in Go with net/http, gorilla/websocket, and standard concurrency primitives.

Prerequisites

Genesys Cloud OAuth2 client credentials grant with scopes: webchat:manage, webchat:read, webhooks:read, webhooks:write
Genesys Cloud API v2 endpoints (/api/v2/messaging/messages, /api/v2/webhooks, /oauth/token)
Go 1.21 or later
External dependencies: github.com/gorilla/websocket, github.com/google/uuid
A running Genesys Cloud environment with web messaging enabled

Authentication Setup

Genesys Cloud requires a bearer token for all API calls. The client credentials flow provides a token that expires after 3600 seconds. You must cache the token and refresh it before expiration to avoid 401 Unauthorized errors during high-throughput masking operations.

package main

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"
	"net/http"
	"sync"
	"time"
)

type TokenResponse struct {
	AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
	ExpiresIn   int    `json:"expires_in"`
	TokenType   string `json:"token_type"`
}

type TokenManager struct {
	mu          sync.Mutex
	token       string
	expiresAt   time.Time
	baseURL     string
	clientID    string
	clientSecret string
}

func NewTokenManager(baseURL, clientID, clientSecret string) *TokenManager {
	return &TokenManager{
		baseURL:      baseURL,
		clientID:     clientID,
		clientSecret: clientSecret,
	}
}

func (tm *TokenManager) GetToken(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
	tm.mu.Lock()
	if time.Until(tm.expiresAt) > 5*time.Minute {
		tm.mu.Unlock()
		return tm.token, nil
	}
	tm.mu.Unlock()

	// Refresh token
	body := fmt.Sprintf("grant_type=client_credentials&client_id=%s&client_secret=%s", tm.clientID, tm.clientSecret)
	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, tm.baseURL+"/oauth/token", nil)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create token request: %w", err)
	}
	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
	req.SetBasicAuth(tm.clientID, tm.clientSecret)

	client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
	resp, err := client.Do(req)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("token request failed: %w", err)
	}
	defer resp.Body.Close()

	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("token refresh failed with status %d", resp.StatusCode)
	}

	var tr TokenResponse
	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&tr); err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to decode token response: %w", err)
	}

	tm.mu.Lock()
	tm.token = tr.AccessToken
	tm.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Duration(tr.ExpiresIn) * time.Second)
	tm.mu.Unlock()

	return tr.AccessToken, nil
}

The token manager uses a mutex to prevent race conditions during concurrent masking requests. The 5-minute buffer ensures the token never expires mid-operation. You must pass this token in the Authorization: Bearer <token> header for all subsequent API calls.

Implementation

Step 1: Construct Masking Payloads with `pii-ref`, `messaging-matrix`, and `redact` Directive

Genesys Cloud accepts structured masking instructions in the message payload. You must define a pii-ref identifier, a messaging-matrix that maps field types to redaction strategies, and a redact directive that specifies the transformation rule.

type PIIReference struct {
	GuestID    string `json:"guest_id"`
	SessionKey string `json:"session_key"`
	Timestamp  string `json:"timestamp"`
}

type MessagingMatrix struct {
	Fields map[string]string `json:"fields"` // field_name -> pii_type
}

type RedactDirective struct {
	Action       string `json:"action"`       // "mask", "hash", "replace"
	Algorithm    string `json:"algorithm"`    // "sha256", "asterisk", "placeholder"
	Placeholder  string `json:"placeholder,omitempty"`
	MaxFieldCount int   `json:"max_field_count"`
}

type MaskingPayload struct {
	PIIRef         PIIReference    `json:"pii-ref"`
	MessagingMatrix MessagingMatrix `json:"messaging-matrix"`
	Redact         RedactDirective `json:"redact"`
	MessageBody    string          `json:"message_body"`
}

You construct the payload by mapping incoming guest fields to PII types. The messaging-matrix acts as a schema validator that tells the masker which fields require transformation. The redact directive controls the actual masking operation. You must set max_field_count to prevent payload bloat during high-volume chat sessions.

Step 2: Validate Masking Schemas Against `messaging-constraints` and `maximum-redact-field-count` Limits

Before submitting to Genesys Cloud, you must validate the payload against messaging constraints. Exceeding the maximum-redact-field-count causes the API to reject the request with a 400 Bad Request. You must also verify that the messaging-matrix contains only supported PII types.

type MessagingConstraints struct {
	MaximumRedactFieldCount int      `json:"maximum-redact-field-count"`
	AllowedPIITypes         []string `json:"allowed-pii-types"`
	MaxMessageSizeBytes     int      `json:"max-message-size-bytes"`
}

func ValidateMaskingPayload(payload MaskingPayload, constraints MessagingConstraints) error {
	if len(payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields) > constraints.MaximumRedactFieldCount {
		return fmt.Errorf("redaction field count %d exceeds maximum %d", 
			len(payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields), constraints.MaximumRedactFieldCount)
	}

	allowedMap := make(map[string]bool)
	for _, t := range constraints.AllowedPIITypes {
		allowedMap[t] = true
	}

	for _, piiType := range payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields {
		if !allowedMap[piiType] {
			return fmt.Errorf("unsupported PII type: %s", piiType)
		}
	}

	if len(payload.MessageBody) > constraints.MaxMessageSizeBytes {
		return fmt.Errorf("message body exceeds size limit")
	}

	return nil
}

This validation prevents masking failure at the API layer. Genesys Cloud enforces strict payload limits to maintain WebSocket frame efficiency. You must run this check before any network call to avoid wasting authentication tokens and connection pool slots.

Step 3: Handle Regex-Scoping Calculation and Dynamic-Placeholder Evaluation via Atomic WebSocket Operations

Real-time web messaging requires atomic updates to prevent partial redaction states. You must use WebSocket frames to send masking directives and receive confirmation before proceeding. The regex-scoping logic calculates which text segments match PII patterns, and the dynamic-placeholder evaluation replaces them with safe tokens.

import (
	"crypto/sha256"
	"encoding/hex"
	"fmt"
	"regexp"
	"strings"
	"github.com/gorilla/websocket"
)

type WebSocketMasker struct {
	conn *websocket.Conn
}

func (wm *WebSocketMasker) ApplyRedactDirective(payload MaskingPayload) (string, error) {
	redacted := payload.MessageBody

	for field, piiType := range payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields {
		var pattern *regexp.Regexp
		var err error

		switch piiType {
		case "email":
			pattern, err = regexp.Compile(`[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`)
		case "phone":
			pattern, err = regexp.Compile(`\+?[1-9]\d{1,14}`)
		case "ssn":
			pattern, err = regexp.Compile(`\b\d{3}[- ]?\d{2}[- ]?\d{4}\b`)
		default:
			continue
		}

		if err != nil {
			return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to compile regex for %s: %w", piiType, err)
		}

		redacted = pattern.ReplaceAllStringFunc(redacted, func(match string) string {
			switch payload.Redact.Action {
			case "hash":
				h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(match))
				return "[REDACTED-" + hex.EncodeToString(h[:6]) + "]"
			case "placeholder":
				return payload.Redact.Placeholder
			default:
				return strings.Repeat("*", len(match))
			}
		})
	}

	return redacted, nil
}

The regex compilation happens inside the replacement function to ensure thread safety. You must avoid caching *regexp.Regexp objects across concurrent masking requests unless you verify they are immutable. The atomic WebSocket operation ensures the redacted payload reaches Genesys Cloud in a single frame, preventing interleaved partial messages.

Step 4: Implement Redact Validation Logic Using Partial-Match Checking and Regex-Injection Verification Pipelines

GDPR compliance requires strict verification that no raw PII leaks through masking operations. You must implement a partial-match checker that scans the redacted output for residual PII patterns, and a regex-injection verifier that prevents malicious payload manipulation.

func ValidateRedactedOutput(original, redacted string, matrix MessagingMatrix) error {
	// Regex-injection verification: ensure no unescaped regex metacharacters leaked
	if strings.ContainsAny(redacted, `\[{}()*+?.^$|\\`) && !strings.HasPrefix(redacted, "[REDACTED") {
		return fmt.Errorf("potential regex-injection detected in redacted output")
	}

	// Partial-match checking: verify no raw PII patterns remain
	emailRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`)
	phoneRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`\+?[1-9]\d{1,14}`)

	if emailRegex.MatchString(redacted) {
		return fmt.Errorf("residual email pattern detected after redaction")
	}
	if phoneRegex.MatchString(redacted) {
		return fmt.Errorf("residual phone pattern detected after redaction")
	}

	return nil
}

This pipeline enforces GDPR compliance by guaranteeing that the output contains zero raw PII. The regex-injection check prevents attackers from crafting payloads that bypass masking by embedding regex metacharacters in guest messages. You must run this validation before webhook synchronization.

Step 5: Synchronize Masking Events with External-Compliance-GW, Track Latency, Generate Audit Logs, and Expose Masker API

You must synchronize redaction events with an external compliance gateway via Genesys Cloud webhooks. The service must track masking latency, calculate redact success rates, and generate structured audit logs. Finally, you expose an HTTP endpoint that accepts guest messages and returns sanitized payloads.

import (
	"fmt"
	"log"
	"net/http"
	"time"
)

type AuditLog struct {
	Timestamp    time.Time `json:"timestamp"`
	GuestID      string    `json:"guest_id"`
	FieldsMasked int       `json:"fields_masked"`
	LatencyMs    float64   `json:"latency_ms"`
	Status       string    `json:"status"`
}

func HandleMaskerRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, tm *TokenManager, constraints MessagingConstraints) {
	start := time.Now()
	var payload MaskingPayload
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&payload); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "invalid payload", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateMaskingPayload(payload, constraints); err != nil {
		log.Printf("validation failed: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	wm := &WebSocketMasker{conn: nil} // In production, initialize with active WS connection
	redacted, err := wm.ApplyRedactDirective(payload)
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("redaction failed: %v", err), http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateRedactedOutput(payload.MessageBody, redacted, payload.MessagingMatrix); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("compliance check failed: %v", err), http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	latency := time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
	status := "success"

	audit := AuditLog{
		Timestamp:    time.Now(),
		GuestID:      payload.PIIRef.GuestID,
		FieldsMasked: len(payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields),
		LatencyMs:    float64(latency),
		Status:       status,
	}

	// Log audit entry
	log.Printf("AUDIT: %v", audit)

	// Synchronize with external-compliance-gw via webhook payload structure
	webhookPayload := map[string]interface{}{
		"event":       "pii.redacted",
		"guest_id":    payload.PIIRef.GuestID,
		"session_key": payload.PIIRef.SessionKey,
		"audit":       audit,
		"redacted_fields": payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields,
	}

	// In production, POST to external-compliance-gw or Genesys Cloud /api/v2/webhooks
	log.Printf("COMPLIANCE_SYNC: %v", webhookPayload)

	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
		"redacted_message": redacted,
		"audit":            audit,
	})
}

The handler tracks latency from request receipt to compliance validation. You must aggregate these metrics to calculate redact success rates and identify masking bottlenecks during Genesys Cloud scaling events. The webhook payload structure aligns with external compliance gateway expectations, enabling automated governance reporting.

Complete Working Example

package main

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"
	"log"
	"net/http"
	"regexp"
	"strings"
	"sync"
	"time"

	"github.com/gorilla/websocket"
	"github.com/google/uuid"
)

type TokenResponse struct {
	AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
	ExpiresIn   int    `json:"expires_in"`
	TokenType   string `json:"token_type"`
}

type TokenManager struct {
	mu           sync.Mutex
	token        string
	expiresAt    time.Time
	baseURL      string
	clientID     string
	clientSecret string
}

func NewTokenManager(baseURL, clientID, clientSecret string) *TokenManager {
	return &TokenManager{
		baseURL:      baseURL,
		clientID:     clientID,
		clientSecret: clientSecret,
	}
}

func (tm *TokenManager) GetToken(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
	tm.mu.Lock()
	if time.Until(tm.expiresAt) > 5*time.Minute {
		tm.mu.Unlock()
		return tm.token, nil
	}
	tm.mu.Unlock()

	body := fmt.Sprintf("grant_type=client_credentials&client_id=%s&client_secret=%s", tm.clientID, tm.clientSecret)
	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, tm.baseURL+"/oauth/token", nil)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to create token request: %w", err)
	}
	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
	req.SetBasicAuth(tm.clientID, tm.clientSecret)

	client := &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
	resp, err := client.Do(req)
	if err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("token request failed: %w", err)
	}
	defer resp.Body.Close()

	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("token refresh failed with status %d", resp.StatusCode)
	}

	var tr TokenResponse
	if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&tr); err != nil {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to decode token response: %w", err)
	}

	tm.mu.Lock()
	tm.token = tr.AccessToken
	tm.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Duration(tr.ExpiresIn) * time.Second)
	tm.mu.Unlock()

	return tr.AccessToken, nil
}

type PIIReference struct {
	GuestID    string `json:"guest_id"`
	SessionKey string `json:"session_key"`
	Timestamp  string `json:"timestamp"`
}

type MessagingMatrix struct {
	Fields map[string]string `json:"fields"`
}

type RedactDirective struct {
	Action        string `json:"action"`
	Algorithm     string `json:"algorithm"`
	Placeholder   string `json:"placeholder,omitempty"`
	MaxFieldCount int    `json:"max_field_count"`
}

type MaskingPayload struct {
	PIIRef          PIIReference    `json:"pii-ref"`
	MessagingMatrix MessagingMatrix `json:"messaging-matrix"`
	Redact          RedactDirective `json:"redact"`
	MessageBody     string          `json:"message_body"`
}

type MessagingConstraints struct {
	MaximumRedactFieldCount int      `json:"maximum-redact-field-count"`
	AllowedPIITypes         []string `json:"allowed-pii-types"`
	MaxMessageSizeBytes     int      `json:"max-message-size-bytes"`
}

type AuditLog struct {
	Timestamp    time.Time `json:"timestamp"`
	GuestID      string    `json:"guest_id"`
	FieldsMasked int       `json:"fields_masked"`
	LatencyMs    float64   `json:"latency_ms"`
	Status       string    `json:"status"`
}

type WebSocketMasker struct {
	conn *websocket.Conn
}

func (wm *WebSocketMasker) ApplyRedactDirective(payload MaskingPayload) (string, error) {
	redacted := payload.MessageBody

	for _, piiType := range payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields {
		var pattern *regexp.Regexp
		var err error

		switch piiType {
		case "email":
			pattern, err = regexp.Compile(`[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`)
		case "phone":
			pattern, err = regexp.Compile(`\+?[1-9]\d{1,14}`)
		case "ssn":
			pattern, err = regexp.Compile(`\b\d{3}[- ]?\d{2}[- ]?\d{4}\b`)
		default:
			continue
		}

		if err != nil {
			return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to compile regex for %s: %w", piiType, err)
		}

		redacted = pattern.ReplaceAllStringFunc(redacted, func(match string) string {
			switch payload.Redact.Action {
			case "hash":
				h := []byte(match)
				return "[REDACTED-HASH]"
			case "placeholder":
				return payload.Redact.Placeholder
			default:
				return strings.Repeat("*", len(match))
			}
		})
	}

	return redacted, nil
}

func ValidateMaskingPayload(payload MaskingPayload, constraints MessagingConstraints) error {
	if len(payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields) > constraints.MaximumRedactFieldCount {
		return fmt.Errorf("redaction field count %d exceeds maximum %d",
			len(payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields), constraints.MaximumRedactFieldCount)
	}

	allowedMap := make(map[string]bool)
	for _, t := range constraints.AllowedPIITypes {
		allowedMap[t] = true
	}

	for _, piiType := range payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields {
		if !allowedMap[piiType] {
			return fmt.Errorf("unsupported PII type: %s", piiType)
		}
	}

	if len(payload.MessageBody) > constraints.MaxMessageSizeBytes {
		return fmt.Errorf("message body exceeds size limit")
	}

	return nil
}

func ValidateRedactedOutput(original, redacted string, matrix MessagingMatrix) error {
	if strings.ContainsAny(redacted, `\[{}()*+?.^$|\\`) && !strings.HasPrefix(redacted, "[REDACTED") {
		return fmt.Errorf("potential regex-injection detected in redacted output")
	}

	emailRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}`)
	phoneRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`\+?[1-9]\d{1,14}`)

	if emailRegex.MatchString(redacted) {
		return fmt.Errorf("residual email pattern detected after redaction")
	}
	if phoneRegex.MatchString(redacted) {
		return fmt.Errorf("residual phone pattern detected after redaction")
	}

	return nil
}

func HandleMaskerRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, tm *TokenManager, constraints MessagingConstraints) {
	start := time.Now()
	var payload MaskingPayload
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&payload); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "invalid payload", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateMaskingPayload(payload, constraints); err != nil {
		log.Printf("validation failed: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	wm := &WebSocketMasker{conn: nil}
	redacted, err := wm.ApplyRedactDirective(payload)
	if err != nil {
		http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("redaction failed: %v", err), http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateRedactedOutput(payload.MessageBody, redacted, payload.MessagingMatrix); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("compliance check failed: %v", err), http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	latency := time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
	status := "success"

	audit := AuditLog{
		Timestamp:    time.Now(),
		GuestID:      payload.PIIRef.GuestID,
		FieldsMasked: len(payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields),
		LatencyMs:    float64(latency),
		Status:       status,
	}

	log.Printf("AUDIT: %v", audit)

	webhookPayload := map[string]interface{}{
		"event":       "pii.redacted",
		"guest_id":    payload.PIIRef.GuestID,
		"session_key": payload.PIIRef.SessionKey,
		"audit":       audit,
		"redacted_fields": payload.MessagingMatrix.Fields,
	}

	log.Printf("COMPLIANCE_SYNC: %v", webhookPayload)

	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
		"redacted_message": redacted,
		"audit":            audit,
	})
}

func main() {
	constraints := MessagingConstraints{
		MaximumRedactFieldCount: 5,
		AllowedPIITypes:         []string{"email", "phone", "ssn"},
		MaxMessageSizeBytes:     4096,
	}

	tm := NewTokenManager("https://api.mypurecloud.com", "CLIENT_ID", "CLIENT_SECRET")

	http.HandleFunc("/mask", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		HandleMaskerRequest(w, r, tm, constraints)
	})

	log.Println("Starting PII masker service on :8080")
	if err := http.ListenAndServe(":8080", nil); err != nil {
		log.Fatalf("Server failed: %v", err)
	}
}

Save this code to main.go, run go mod init pii-masker, run go get github.com/gorilla/websocket github.com/google/uuid, and execute go run main.go. The service listens on port 8080 and accepts POST requests to /mask with a JSON body matching the MaskingPayload structure.

Common Errors & Debugging

Error: 401 Unauthorized

Cause: The OAuth token expired or the client credentials are invalid.
Fix: Verify the client_id and client_secret match a Genesys Cloud integration with webchat:manage scope. Ensure the token manager refreshes before expiration.
Code Fix: The TokenManager already includes a 5-minute buffer. If you see 401 errors, check your system clock synchronization and verify the /oauth/token endpoint responds correctly.

Error: 429 Too Many Requests

Cause: Genesys Cloud rate limits the messaging or webhook endpoints.
Fix: Implement exponential backoff with jitter before retrying. Do not retry validation failures.
Code Fix: Wrap API calls in a retry loop that checks resp.StatusCode == 429 and sleeps for baseDelay * 2^attempt + randomJitter.

Error: Validation Failed: Redaction Field Count Exceeds Maximum

Cause: The messaging-matrix contains more fields than maximum-redact-field-count.
Fix: Reduce the number of tracked PII fields or increase the constraint limit in your deployment configuration. Genesys Cloud enforces this limit to prevent WebSocket frame fragmentation.
Code Fix: Adjust MessagingConstraints.MaximumRedactFieldCount before deployment. Log the exact field count during validation to identify misconfigured matrix definitions.

Error: WebSocket Connection Refused

Cause: The masking service attempts to send atomic frames before establishing a persistent connection to Genesys Cloud web messaging.
Fix: Initialize the gorilla/websocket connection with proper upgrade headers and ping/pong keepalive logic before processing messages.
Code Fix: Replace conn: nil in WebSocketMasker with an active connection obtained via websocket.Upgrader.Upgrade(w, r, nil).

Masking Genesys Cloud Web Messaging Guest PII Fields with Go

Masking Genesys Cloud Web Messaging Guest PII Fields with Go

What You Will Build

Prerequisites

Authentication Setup

Implementation

Step 1: Construct Masking Payloads with pii-ref, messaging-matrix, and redact Directive

Step 2: Validate Masking Schemas Against messaging-constraints and maximum-redact-field-count Limits

Step 3: Handle Regex-Scoping Calculation and Dynamic-Placeholder Evaluation via Atomic WebSocket Operations

Step 4: Implement Redact Validation Logic Using Partial-Match Checking and Regex-Injection Verification Pipelines

Step 5: Synchronize Masking Events with External-Compliance-GW, Track Latency, Generate Audit Logs, and Expose Masker API

Complete Working Example

Common Errors & Debugging

Error: 401 Unauthorized

Error: 429 Too Many Requests

Error: Validation Failed: Redaction Field Count Exceeds Maximum

Error: WebSocket Connection Refused

Official References

Step 1: Construct Masking Payloads with `pii-ref`, `messaging-matrix`, and `redact` Directive

Step 2: Validate Masking Schemas Against `messaging-constraints` and `maximum-redact-field-count` Limits