Attesting Genesys Cloud STIR/SHAKEN Signatures via Telephony API with Rust
What You Will Build
- A Rust service that constructs STIR/SHAKEN attestation payloads, validates certificate chains against Genesys Cloud telephony constraints, verifies caller ID formats, checks revocation lists, and posts atomic attestations to the Telephony API.
- This tutorial uses the Genesys Cloud Telephony API endpoints for STIR/SHAKEN certificate management and edge configuration.
- The implementation is written in modern Rust using
reqwest,serde,tokio, andsha2for cryptographic validation and audit logging.
Prerequisites
- Genesys Cloud OAuth client credentials with
telephony:edge:stirshaken:readandtelephony:edge:stirshaken:writescopes - Genesys Cloud API version v2
- Rust toolchain version 1.75 or higher
- External dependencies:
reqwest = { version = "0.11", features = ["json"] },serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] },serde_json = "1.0",tokio = { version = "1.0", features = ["full"] },sha2 = "0.10",hex = "0.4",chrono = { version = "0.4", features = ["serde"] },log = "0.4",env_logger = "0.10"
Authentication Setup
Genesys Cloud requires OAuth 2.0 client credentials flow. The following code demonstrates token acquisition, caching, and automatic refresh when the token expires. The token endpoint requires the client_id, client_secret, and grant_type=client_credentials parameters.
use reqwest::Client;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct OAuthTokenResponse {
access_token: String,
expires_in: u32,
token_type: String,
}
struct TokenCache {
token: Option<String>,
expires_at: Option<Instant>,
client_id: String,
client_secret: String,
base_url: String,
}
impl TokenCache {
fn new(client_id: String, client_secret: String, base_url: String) -> Self {
Self {
token: None,
expires_at: None,
client_id,
client_secret,
base_url,
}
}
async fn get_valid_token(&mut self) -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
if let Some(expiry) = self.expires_at {
if expiry > Instant::now() {
return self.token.clone().ok_or("Token not initialized".into());
}
}
let client = Client::new();
let response = client
.post(format!("{}/api/v2/oauth/token", self.base_url))
.form(&[
("grant_type", "client_credentials"),
("client_id", &self.client_id),
("client_secret", &self.client_secret),
])
.send()
.await?
.error_for_status()?;
let token_data: OAuthTokenResponse = response.json().await?;
self.token = Some(token_data.access_token.clone());
self.expires_at = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(token_data.expires_in as u64 - 60));
Ok(token_data.access_token)
}
}
Implementation
Step 1: Construct and Validate Attestation Payloads
STIR/SHAKEN attestation requires a certificate matrix, call ID references, and a trust directive. Genesys Cloud enforces a maximum certificate chain length of three certificates. The following code constructs the payload, validates the schema, and computes a SHA-256 digest for policy compliance.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
use hex;
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)]
struct AttestationPayload {
#[serde(rename = "callId")]
call_id: String,
#[serde(rename = "certificateChain")]
certificate_chain: Vec<String>,
#[serde(rename = "trustDirective")]
trust_directive: String,
#[serde(rename = "attestationLevel")]
attestation_level: String,
}
fn validate_attest_schema(payload: &AttestationPayload) -> Result<(), String> {
if payload.certificate_chain.len() > 3 {
return Err("Maximum certificate chain limit exceeded. Genesys Cloud telephony engine enforces a maximum of 3 certificates.".into());
}
if !["A", "B", "C", "v"].contains(&payload.attestation_level.as_str()) {
return Err("Invalid attestation level. Must be A, B, C, or v.".into());
}
if payload.trust_directive.is_empty() {
return Err("Trust directive cannot be empty.".into());
}
Ok(())
}
fn compute_sha256_digest(certs: &[String]) -> String {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
for cert in certs {
hasher.update(cert.as_bytes());
}
let result = hasher.finalize();
hex::encode(result)
}
async fn post_certificate(
client: &Client,
token: &str,
base_url: &str,
edge_id: &str,
payload: &AttestationPayload,
) -> Result<serde_json::Value, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let url = format!("{}/api/v2/telephony/providers/edges/{}/stirshaken/certificates", base_url, edge_id);
let response = client
.post(&url)
.header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {}", token))
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.json(payload)
.send()
.await?;
match response.status().as_u16() {
201 => {
let body = response.json::<serde_json::Value>().await?;
log::info!("Certificate attested successfully: {}", body);
Ok(body)
}
429 => {
log::warn!("Rate limit hit. Implementing exponential backoff.");
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
post_certificate(client, token, base_url, edge_id, payload).await
}
status => {
let error_text = response.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
Err(format!("HTTP {}: {}", status, error_text).into())
}
}
}
Expected Response:
{
"id": "stirshaken-cert-8f3a2b1c-4d5e-6f7a-8b9c-0d1e2f3a4b5c",
"callId": "call-ref-98765",
"certificateChain": ["-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIC...", "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIID..."],
"trustDirective": "trust-anchor-01",
"attestationLevel": "A",
"createdBy": "api-client",
"createdTime": "2024-01-15T10:30:00.000Z"
}
Step 2: Caller ID Verification and Revocation List Triggers
Caller ID verification requires atomic POST operations with format validation. The system must trigger automatic revocation list checks before attestation. The following code validates E.164 format, checks against a simulated revocation list, and enforces policy compliance.
use regex::Regex;
fn validate_e164_format(caller_id: &str) -> bool {
let re = Regex::new(r"^\+?[1-9]\d{1,14}$").unwrap();
re.is_match(caller_id)
}
struct RevocationList {
revoked_ids: Vec<String>,
}
impl RevocationList {
fn is_revoked(&self, cert_id: &str) -> bool {
self.revoked_ids.contains(&cert_id.to_string())
}
}
async fn verify_caller_id_and_attest(
client: &Client,
token: &str,
base_url: &str,
edge_id: &str,
caller_id: &str,
payload: &AttestationPayload,
revocation_list: &RevocationList,
) -> Result<serde_json::Value, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
if !validate_e164_format(caller_id) {
return Err("Caller ID format invalid. Must comply with E.164 standard.".into());
}
if let Some(cert_id) = payload.call_id.strip_prefix("cert-") {
if revocation_list.is_revoked(cert_id) {
return Err("Certificate flagged in revocation list. Attestation blocked.".into());
}
}
let digest = compute_sha256_digest(&payload.certificate_chain);
log::info!("SHA-256 digest computed: {}", digest);
post_certificate(client, token, base_url, edge_id, payload).await
}
Step 3: Webhook Synchronization, Latency Tracking, and Audit Logging
Attestation events must synchronize with external CNAM databases via signature attested webhooks. The system tracks latency, calculates verification success rates, and generates structured audit logs for telephony governance.
use chrono::Utc;
use std::collections::HashMap;
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct AuditLog {
timestamp: String,
event_type: String,
caller_id: String,
attestation_level: String,
success: bool,
latency_ms: u64,
error_message: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct CnamSyncPayload {
#[serde(rename = "callId")]
call_id: String,
#[serde(rename = "attestationLevel")]
attestation_level: String,
#[serde(rename = "verifiedCallerId")]
verified_caller_id: String,
#[serde(rename = "timestamp")]
timestamp: String,
}
struct MetricsTracker {
total_attempts: u64,
successful_attestations: u64,
total_latency_ms: u64,
}
impl MetricsTracker {
fn record_attempt(&mut self, latency: u64, success: bool) {
self.total_attempts += 1;
self.total_latency_ms += latency;
if success {
self.successful_attestations += 1;
}
}
fn get_success_rate(&self) -> f64 {
if self.total_attempts == 0 { 0.0 } else {
(self.successful_attestations as f64 / self.total_attempts as f64) * 100.0
}
}
}
async fn sync_with_cnam_webhook(client: &Client, webhook_url: &str, payload: &CnamSyncPayload) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let _response = client
.post(webhook_url)
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.json(payload)
.send()
.await?;
log::info!("CNAM database synchronized via webhook.");
Ok(())
}
async fn run_attestation_pipeline(
client: &Client,
token: &str,
base_url: &str,
edge_id: &str,
caller_id: &str,
payload: &AttestationPayload,
revocation_list: &RevocationList,
cnam_webhook_url: &str,
metrics: &mut MetricsTracker,
audit_logs: &mut Vec<AuditLog>,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let start = Instant::now();
let result = verify_caller_id_and_attest(
client, token, base_url, edge_id, caller_id, payload, revocation_list
).await;
let latency = start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
let success = result.is_ok();
metrics.record_attempt(latency, success);
let log_entry = AuditLog {
timestamp: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
event_type: "stirshaken_attestation".to_string(),
caller_id: caller_id.to_string(),
attestation_level: payload.attestation_level.clone(),
success,
latency_ms: latency,
error_message: if !success { Some(format!("{:?}", result.unwrap_err())) } else { None },
};
audit_logs.push(log_entry);
log::info!("Audit log generated: {:?}", log_entry);
if success {
let cnam_payload = CnamSyncPayload {
call_id: payload.call_id.clone(),
attestation_level: payload.attestation_level.clone(),
verified_caller_id: caller_id.to_string(),
timestamp: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
};
sync_with_cnam_webhook(client, cnam_webhook_url, &cnam_payload).await?;
}
result.map(|_| ())
}
Complete Working Example
The following script combines authentication, payload construction, validation, attestation, webhook synchronization, metrics tracking, and audit logging into a single executable module. Replace the placeholder credentials and endpoint URLs with your Genesys Cloud environment values.
use reqwest::Client;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
use hex;
use chrono::Utc;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use regex::Regex;
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct OAuthTokenResponse {
access_token: String,
expires_in: u32,
token_type: String,
}
struct TokenCache {
token: Option<String>,
expires_at: Option<Instant>,
client_id: String,
client_secret: String,
base_url: String,
}
impl TokenCache {
fn new(client_id: String, client_secret: String, base_url: String) -> Self {
Self {
token: None,
expires_at: None,
client_id,
client_secret,
base_url,
}
}
async fn get_valid_token(&mut self) -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
if let Some(expiry) = self.expires_at {
if expiry > Instant::now() {
return self.token.clone().ok_or("Token not initialized".into());
}
}
let client = Client::new();
let response = client
.post(format!("{}/api/v2/oauth/token", self.base_url))
.form(&[
("grant_type", "client_credentials"),
("client_id", &self.client_id),
("client_secret", &self.client_secret),
])
.send()
.await?
.error_for_status()?;
let token_data: OAuthTokenResponse = response.json().await?;
self.token = Some(token_data.access_token.clone());
self.expires_at = Some(Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(token_data.expires_in as u64 - 60));
Ok(token_data.access_token)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Clone)]
struct AttestationPayload {
#[serde(rename = "callId")]
call_id: String,
#[serde(rename = "certificateChain")]
certificate_chain: Vec<String>,
#[serde(rename = "trustDirective")]
trust_directive: String,
#[serde(rename = "attestationLevel")]
attestation_level: String,
}
fn validate_attest_schema(payload: &AttestationPayload) -> Result<(), String> {
if payload.certificate_chain.len() > 3 {
return Err("Maximum certificate chain limit exceeded. Genesys Cloud telephony engine enforces a maximum of 3 certificates.".into());
}
if !["A", "B", "C", "v"].contains(&payload.attestation_level.as_str()) {
return Err("Invalid attestation level. Must be A, B, C, or v.".into());
}
if payload.trust_directive.is_empty() {
return Err("Trust directive cannot be empty.".into());
}
Ok(())
}
fn compute_sha256_digest(certs: &[String]) -> String {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
for cert in certs {
hasher.update(cert.as_bytes());
}
let result = hasher.finalize();
hex::encode(result)
}
async fn post_certificate(
client: &Client,
token: &str,
base_url: &str,
edge_id: &str,
payload: &AttestationPayload,
) -> Result<serde_json::Value, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let url = format!("{}/api/v2/telephony/providers/edges/{}/stirshaken/certificates", base_url, edge_id);
let response = client
.post(&url)
.header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {}", token))
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.json(payload)
.send()
.await?;
match response.status().as_u16() {
201 => {
let body = response.json::<serde_json::Value>().await?;
log::info!("Certificate attested successfully: {}", body);
Ok(body)
}
429 => {
log::warn!("Rate limit hit. Implementing exponential backoff.");
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
post_certificate(client, token, base_url, edge_id, payload).await
}
status => {
let error_text = response.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
Err(format!("HTTP {}: {}", status, error_text).into())
}
}
}
fn validate_e164_format(caller_id: &str) -> bool {
let re = Regex::new(r"^\+?[1-9]\d{1,14}$").unwrap();
re.is_match(caller_id)
}
struct RevocationList {
revoked_ids: Vec<String>,
}
impl RevocationList {
fn is_revoked(&self, cert_id: &str) -> bool {
self.revoked_ids.contains(&cert_id.to_string())
}
}
async fn verify_caller_id_and_attest(
client: &Client,
token: &str,
base_url: &str,
edge_id: &str,
caller_id: &str,
payload: &AttestationPayload,
revocation_list: &RevocationList,
) -> Result<serde_json::Value, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
if !validate_e164_format(caller_id) {
return Err("Caller ID format invalid. Must comply with E.164 standard.".into());
}
if let Some(cert_id) = payload.call_id.strip_prefix("cert-") {
if revocation_list.is_revoked(cert_id) {
return Err("Certificate flagged in revocation list. Attestation blocked.".into());
}
}
let digest = compute_sha256_digest(&payload.certificate_chain);
log::info!("SHA-256 digest computed: {}", digest);
post_certificate(client, token, base_url, edge_id, payload).await
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct AuditLog {
timestamp: String,
event_type: String,
caller_id: String,
attestation_level: String,
success: bool,
latency_ms: u64,
error_message: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct CnamSyncPayload {
#[serde(rename = "callId")]
call_id: String,
#[serde(rename = "attestationLevel")]
attestation_level: String,
#[serde(rename = "verifiedCallerId")]
verified_caller_id: String,
#[serde(rename = "timestamp")]
timestamp: String,
}
struct MetricsTracker {
total_attempts: u64,
successful_attestations: u64,
total_latency_ms: u64,
}
impl MetricsTracker {
fn record_attempt(&mut self, latency: u64, success: bool) {
self.total_attempts += 1;
self.total_latency_ms += latency;
if success {
self.successful_attestations += 1;
}
}
fn get_success_rate(&self) -> f64 {
if self.total_attempts == 0 { 0.0 } else {
(self.successful_attestations as f64 / self.total_attempts as f64) * 100.0
}
}
}
async fn sync_with_cnam_webhook(client: &Client, webhook_url: &str, payload: &CnamSyncPayload) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let _response = client
.post(webhook_url)
.header("Content-Type", "application/json")
.json(payload)
.send()
.await?;
log::info!("CNAM database synchronized via webhook.");
Ok(())
}
async fn run_attestation_pipeline(
client: &Client,
token: &str,
base_url: &str,
edge_id: &str,
caller_id: &str,
payload: &AttestationPayload,
revocation_list: &RevocationList,
cnam_webhook_url: &str,
metrics: &mut MetricsTracker,
audit_logs: &mut Vec<AuditLog>,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let start = Instant::now();
let result = verify_caller_id_and_attest(
client, token, base_url, edge_id, caller_id, payload, revocation_list
).await;
let latency = start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
let success = result.is_ok();
metrics.record_attempt(latency, success);
let log_entry = AuditLog {
timestamp: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
event_type: "stirshaken_attestation".to_string(),
caller_id: caller_id.to_string(),
attestation_level: payload.attestation_level.clone(),
success,
latency_ms: latency,
error_message: if !success { Some(format!("{:?}", result.unwrap_err())) } else { None },
};
audit_logs.push(log_entry);
log::info!("Audit log generated: {:?}", log_entry);
if success {
let cnam_payload = CnamSyncPayload {
call_id: payload.call_id.clone(),
attestation_level: payload.attestation_level.clone(),
verified_caller_id: caller_id.to_string(),
timestamp: Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
};
sync_with_cnam_webhook(client, cnam_webhook_url, &cnam_payload).await?;
}
result.map(|_| ())
}
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
env_logger::init();
let client = Client::new();
let mut token_cache = TokenCache::new(
"YOUR_CLIENT_ID".to_string(),
"YOUR_CLIENT_SECRET".to_string(),
"https://api.mypurecloud.com".to_string(),
);
let token = token_cache.get_valid_token().await?;
let edge_id = "your-edge-id";
let cnam_webhook_url = "https://your-cnam-sync-endpoint.com/webhook";
let payload = AttestationPayload {
call_id: "cert-98765".to_string(),
certificate_chain: vec![
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIIC...".to_string(),
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIID...".to_string(),
],
trust_directive: "trust-anchor-01".to_string(),
attestation_level: "A".to_string(),
};
validate_attest_schema(&payload)?;
let revocation_list = RevocationList {
revoked_ids: vec!["revoked-cert-001".to_string()],
};
let mut metrics = MetricsTracker {
total_attempts: 0,
successful_attestations: 0,
total_latency_ms: 0,
};
let mut audit_logs = Vec::new();
run_attestation_pipeline(
&client, &token, "https://api.mypurecloud.com", edge_id, "+12025551234",
&payload, &revocation_list, cnam_webhook_url, &mut metrics, &mut audit_logs
).await?;
println!("Verification success rate: {:.2}%", metrics.get_success_rate());
println!("Total attestations processed: {}", metrics.total_attempts);
for log in &audit_logs {
println!("Audit: {:?}", log);
}
Ok(())
}
Common Errors & Debugging
Error: HTTP 401 Unauthorized
- Cause: The OAuth token has expired or the client credentials are incorrect.
- Fix: Ensure the
TokenCacherefreshes the token before expiry. Verify thatclient_idandclient_secretmatch the Genesys Cloud application settings. - Code fix: The
get_valid_tokenmethod subtracts 60 seconds fromexpires_into trigger early refresh. If 401 persists, regenerate credentials in the Genesys Cloud admin console.
Error: HTTP 403 Forbidden
- Cause: The OAuth client lacks the required scopes.
- Fix: Add
telephony:edge:stirshaken:readandtelephony:edge:stirshaken:writeto the application scopes in Genesys Cloud. - Code fix: Re-authorize the client after scope updates. The token must be regenerated to include the new permissions.
Error: HTTP 400 Bad Request (Schema Validation)
- Cause: Certificate chain exceeds the three-certificate limit, or attestation level is invalid.
- Fix: Trim the certificate chain to the leaf, intermediate, and root certificates only. Verify
attestation_levelmatchesA,B,C, orv. - Code fix: The
validate_attest_schemafunction enforces these constraints before the API call. Adjust the payload construction logic to filter expired or duplicate certificates.
Error: HTTP 429 Too Many Requests
- Cause: Rate limit cascade across the telephony microservices.
- Fix: Implement exponential backoff. Genesys Cloud returns
Retry-Afterheaders when possible. - Code fix: The
post_certificatefunction detects 429 status codes and sleeps for five seconds before retrying. For production systems, parse theRetry-Afterheader and scale the backoff interval.
Error: HTTP 5xx Server Error
- Cause: Temporary telephony engine degradation or certificate parsing failure.
- Fix: Retry with jitter. Verify PEM encoding matches RFC 7468.
- Code fix: Wrap the pipeline in a retry loop with randomized delays between 2 and 8 seconds. Log the raw response body for Genesys Cloud support ticket creation.